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INTRODUCTION 
The transformation of the Hungarian economy after the fall of the communist 
regime had a tremendous effect on the careers of Hungarian workers. The 
reforms and changes since 1988 have impacted on both young and senior 
workers, and have great1y determined their life chances (Bukodi and Róbert 
2002, 2003). Kolosi and Róbert (2004) revealed that one-third of the 
population left the labor market between 1988 and 2003. Whereas one-half of 
these left paid employment because they had reached normal retirement age, 
the other half was more or less compelled to leave the labor market. Apart 
from the transition to capitalism, the process of growing intemational 
competition known as globalization might also have had relevant effects on 
the late careers of Hungarian workers. A substantial body of literature (e.g., 
Beck 1992; Giddens 1999) anticipates increasing risks in individual life 
courses and regards globalization as the main driving force behind this 
development. However, other scholars emphasize the national path 
dependency of this process: specific institutional arrangements such as 
educational systems, the regulation of the labor market, or welfare state 
provisions may reshape the impact of globalization on individuals' life 
chances (Blossfeld 2001; Blossfeld, Buchholz and Hofacker 2006; Buchholz 
et al. 2009). 
In this chapter, we first outline how macro-economic developments and 
the institutional context have influenced the Hungarian labor market during 
the period of economic and social transformation. We describe the main labor 
market trends, the changes of retirement policies, and the role of the 
educational system. In the following section, we present our hypotheses on 
how these macro-econornÍc and institutional changes have influenced the late 
careers of Hungarian workers, and its consequences on pension income. 
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Then, we describe the statistical methods used in our analyses. In the 
empirical parí, we provide estimates from event history models predicting the 
risk of unemployment and the likelihood of early exit from the labor force via 
normal retirement or disability pensiono We also provide estimates from a 
linear regression model examining the determinants of pension income. In 
our analyses, we use data from the Household Monitor Survey conducted by 
the TÁRKI Social Research Center in 2003. This is the most appropriate data 
source available, and provides the necessary information for the period 
between 1988 and 2003. 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL 
CONTEXT 
Main Labor Market Trends 
The collapse of communism entailed a series of major changes in the 
Hungarian labor market. Many jobs were destroyed immediately after the 
change of regime; but later on, during the 1990s, job creation rates increased 
and job destruction rates fell (Commander and Koll6 2004). The creation of 
jobs was more intense in new private firms, whereas job destruction was the 
dominant trend in state-owned and privatized firms with rather old 
equipment. Kézdi (2002) has argued that job creation and job destruction 
varied substantially during the different phases of the transition to a market 
economy. Major destruction of low-skilled jobs and large intersectorial 
reallocation, partly toward skill-intensive industries, was strongest until1995, 
during the transitional crises. After 1996, employment started to rise, and a 
pervasive skill upgrade has been seen in all sectors ever since. Overall, job 
creation in new firms has tended to be biased against employees with low 
educational attainments. It must be said that the demand for unskilled labor 
already started to diminish at the end of the socialist period, but it dropped 
even more sharply after the regime change. The number of jobs available to 
people with elementary school education or vocational training fell by 48 
percent between 1990 and 1995, and has not risen subsequently. Skill 
expectations in manual work shifted upward, so that the traditional white-
and blue-collar divide gradually disappeared (Commander and Ko1l6 2004). 
With such an evolution of employment demand, Kertesi and Koll6 (2002) 
concluded that the two principal changes in the labor market during the 
transition period were a considerable increase in the returns to skill, and a 
marked decrease in the retums to age and employment experience. As a 
result, the initial wage disadvantage of young people relative to older cohorts 
diminished. In other words, the transition resulted in strong discrimination 
against (older) unskilled workers who disproportionately lost employment in 
comparison to their more skilled (and younger) counterparts. 
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Early Retirement and Disability Pensions 
Hence, it is not surprising that the employment rate of senior workers decreased 
sharply during the transitional crisis, and this was fostered by various 
incentives for early exit: instead of mass dismissals, Hungarian firms made use 
of early retirement and disability pension schemes as the least painful means of 
workforce reduction. There was, in fact, a rapid increase in the number of 
individuals covered by early retirement and disability pensions schemes until 
the mid-1990s (Széman 1994; Ko1l6 and Nacsa 2004). In 1991-97, early 
retirement accounted for a high and growing percentage of total retirement, 
rising from 23 percent in 1991 to 30 percent in 1997. However, when the 
government decided to raise the retirement age and introduce stricter conditions 
for participating in disability schemes, early retirement first dropped to 17 
percent by 1998 and then to 3-4 percent by 2001. 
At the beginning of the economic transition, labor market participation 
was high for employees of all ages, but it then decreased almost evenly 
across age groups. Employment rates of most age groups started to rise again 
only in 1997, but showed only little change among senior workers. Their 
employment rates increased only between 1999 and 2003 - reflecting the 
above-mentioned policy changes. Even though eligibility conditions for early 
retirement and disability pension have been tightened up gradually in recent 
years, only a small minority of the population over 55 years of age is 
currently participating in the labor market due to the use of mass early 
retirement schemes in previous years. 
It is also noteworthy that according to census data, a significant number of 
Hungarians aged 55-59 receive some kind of disability payment, whereas 
this figure is much lower for people over 60. We believe this indicates that 
choosing disability pension was another widespread means for senior 
employees to exit from the labor market during the economic crisis and even 
also during the following period of economic recovery, when access to 
normal retirement was restricted, as is described in the next section. 
Table 8.1 Distribution ofindividuals aged 50-64 by employment status (2001) 
Men Women 
50-54 55-59 60-64 50-54 55-59 60-64 
Working 61.9 44.3 4.9 58.8 11.4 1.1 
W orking retired 1.4 2.0 4.8 1.4 6.0 3.2 
Unemp10yed 5.5 3.3 0.4 3.6 0.8 0.2 
Retired 3.8 16.6 77.5 3.6 61.0 83.8 
Disability pension 20.8 27.5 11.0 22.1 14.4 5.0 
Home duties 6.6 6.3 1.4 10.5 6.4 6.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own calculations based on the Hungarian Census (2001). 
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Changes in Hungarian Pension Schemes 
The predecessor of the current Hungarian public pensio.n system, ~stablished 
in 1929, coIlapsed during World War 11. After the war, lt was rebUllt and had 
gready matured by the 1980s, with near-universal coverage, generous 
replacement rates, and very low retirement ages (55 for women, 60 for me~; 
see Gál and Tarcali 2003). By 1990, the (net) wage replacement of pubhc 
pension amounted to an average of 66 percent. In prin~iple, the defin~d­
benefit pension system provided earnings-related penslons, but maSSlve 
redistribution resulted in a dysfunctional system in which incentives were 
mixed up with solidarity (Simonovits 1999). 
The transformation crisis led to several changes in the pension system 
between 1989 and 1992. The formally independent Pension Insurance Fund 
(PI) and Health Insurance Fund (HI) were separated from the state budget, 
and the regulations for pension contributions and benefits were reformed. 
The Hungarian system continued to be a defined-benefit system based on 
contributions, with entry and continuing pensions being calculated 
separately: the entry pension (i.e., newly awarded pension) is now a function 
of both contribution years and the average earnings throughout the 
assessment periodo The Pension Law 1991 retained the degressive accrual 
rates ofthe socialist era in which 10 years of service meant 33 percent wage 
replacement. Every additional year up to 25 years added another. 2 per~ent, 
and every additional year to 32 years yielded 1 percent, endm~ ';lth a 
maximum of 70 percent. The law also introduced a (delayed) valonzatlOn of 
the assessed earnings used to determine entry pensions. The assessment of 
earnings is strongly degressive, but for a large portion of the newly retired in 
the last decade - even after contributing for at least 20 years - assessed 
earnings were so low that the pension needed to be replaced by the relatively 
decent minimum pensiono The continuing pension is a simple increasing 
linear function of the previous pensiono Similar to the valorization of entry 
pensions, continuing pensions have also been indexed according to national 
average wages since 1992. 
OveraIl, the public pension system succeeded in protecting the aged from 
poverty throughout the economic crisis of the 1990s. Though pensions l~st 
their value relative to wages, other sources of income for the nonworking 
population declined much faster (Gál and Tarcali 2003). Consequendy, the 
relative income status of pensioners improved during the last decade, thereby 
making pensions attractive for senior workers. As the only settled insti~ti~nal 
system, pensions absorbed a disproportionate part of the labor market cnS1S of 
the early transition years and provided an 'escape route' for hun~eds of 
thousands of redundant workers. However, this development undermmed the 
long-term stability ofthe system and induced an extensive reform in 1998. 
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Although the current Hungarian pension system consists of three pillars, 
these correspond only partially to those typical throughout the European 
Union. The first pillar is a mandatory, public, pay-as-you-go system based on 
defined benefits. It provides eamings-related old-age, disability and survivors' 
benefits assessed on the basis of average salary and number of years spent in 
service. It encompasses all occupational groups, though special rules (e.g., for 
retirement age, assessment period, or accrual rates) are applied to sorne 
occupational groups (e.g., miners, members ofthe armed forces). The official 
retirement age for women was increased by one year in every second year 
until 2009, thereby raising it from age 55 to age 62. The pensionable age for 
men was increased from age 61 in 1998 to 62 years in 2000. 
The fully funded, privately managed second pillar comprises mandatory 
private pension funds introduced in the 1998 pension reformo These are 
organized as nonprofit mutual savings associations in which members (the 
insured persons) are not only clients but also the exclusive owners of the 
fundo Private funds can be founded by businesses, professional associations, 
or representative bodies of employers or employees. Members are obliged to 
pay monthly contributions, whereas the employer is responsible for 
collecting, reporting and transferring contributions to the pension funds 
selected by these employees. 
The first and second pillars combined constitute the mandatory pension 
component (a so-called 'mixed system'). The coverage of this compulsory 
system includes all persons who are engaged in sorne kind of gainful 
employrnent, and persons entering the labor market for the first time are 
automatically enrolled into this system. Those who acquired pension rights 
before 1998 could either voluntarily opt into the mixed system by September 
1999 or remain in the pure pay-as-you-go scheme. The third pillar is made up 
of voluntary private pension funds. These were introduced in 1994 and have 
the same institutional and organizational settings as the second pillar funds 
(self-govemance, co-ownership of members, individual accounts, nonprofit 
principIe, defined contribution, capital-funded financing, etc.). Persons can 
enter a voluntary fund at their own discretion. Neither the second nor the 
third pillar can be regarded as occupational schemes in the literal sense, 
because the underlying contractual relationship is not between the employee 
and the employer but between the fund member and the pension fundo 
Nonetheless, employers are involved in more than one important respect. On 
the one hand, companies are allowed to establish second pillar private 
pension funds, or they may cooperate in setting up a voluntary pension fund 
by covering the costs related to its foundation. On the other hand, employers 
may supplement employees' monthly contributions to both types offunds. 
There are three main types of early retirement that have not undergone any 
relevant changes in their regulation over the past few years. First, workers in 
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physically demanding or hazardous professions are entitled to retire prior to 
the official retirement age. Men and women engaged in such activities for at 
least ten or eight years respectively are permitted to claim old-age benefit two 
years prior to the normal pension age. Second, those with a long duration of 
service (at least 33 years) are entitled to draw their pensions five (women) or 
two (men) years before the official retirement age. Third, anyone with at least 
33 years of service may retire five years before the official age on the 
condition that the employer is willing to reimburse the amount of pension 
benefits to the State Pension Insurance Fund up to the official retirement age. 
Globalization, Education, and Technological Innovation 
Lelkes and Scharle (2004) have shown that the correlation between education 
and labor market status appears to have strengthened in the 1990s, because 
the likelihood of inactivity increased for those with low levels of education 
but hardly changed for the highly qualified. In 2003, only 43 percent of 
Hungarians aged 40-59 withjust elementary education had a paidjob, and 38 
percent of them had already retired. Moreover, the proportion of older 
individuals with low education levels who are not in the labor market for at 
least 12 months has been gradually increasing from 'only' 3 percent in the 
early 1990s to 10 percent in 2003. These figures point to an extreme 
vulnerability of senior Hungarian workers with no or limited qualifications: 
they tend to lose their jobs, and their chance of reentering the labor market is 
distinctively low. This vulnerability is accentuated by the relatively low 
pressure for workers to enter further training in Hungary. Despite a general 
increase in job training rates over the last decade, there has been a sharp 
reduction in participation in further education as a function of age: whereas 
15 percent of workers aged 25-34 years participated in professional and 
career upgrading in 2003, the corresponding rates for those aged 35-44 years 
were 8 percent; and for those aged 45-54 years, just 4 percent. 
The diffusion of technological innovations fostered by the globalization 
process increases the rate of change in occupational structure and job content 
in modern societies. Structural changes result in mobility flows from 
declining (such as agriculture and industry) into expanding sectors (such as 
financial and business services or public services; see DiPrete et al. 2001). 
However, employees leaving the declining branches are not necessarily able 
to get ajob in expanding industries. In Hungary, structural economic changes 
have strongly influenced the demand side of the labor market in recent 
decades. During the 1960s and 1970s, agricultural employment decreased 
gradually, and the country moved toward an industrial society. Employment 
in the service sector started to increase only in the 1980s and 1990s, when 
more and more jobs were created there. However, the increasing share of 
service sector workers was due only partly to an increasing demand for 
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services. It was also an outcome ofthe transformation-related economic crisis 
that led to the collapse of various spheres of state industry. Massive job 
dismissal took place in the heavy and chemical industries textiles 
construction, mining and agriculture (Ehrlich and Révész 1994). A~ the sam~ 
time, by 2003, the share of service employment had increased to almost 60 
percent for workers aged 40 and over: 30 percent were found in 
governmental services, 21 percent in distributive services (sales, transport), 7 
percent in producer services (financial and business services communication 
etc.) and 2 percent in 'traditional' personal services.' , 
HYPOTHESES 
In this section, we present our research questions and hypotheses on the 
impact of economic transformation, pension reforms, de-industrialization, 
and globalization on late careers and its consequences on pension incomes. 
Late Careers 
Changes over cohorts 
Our first hypothesis is that senior workers belonging to more recent cohorts 
have higher risks of suffering unemployment than their counterparts in earlier 
cohorts (H 1). We believe that as reforms aimed to flexibilize the labor market 
were implemented the risks of unemployment increased, and unstable and 
volatile work careers became more frequent, especially in more recent 
cohorts. An important reason to believe that unemployment was less severe 
among earlier cohorts (e.g., for workers who were already over 50 at the time 
of the collapse of the socialist regime) is that they could profit from state-
sponsored early retirement policies. These policies, aimed to prevent 
unemployment by channeling redundant senior workers out of the labor 
market into retirement, remained active only until the mid-1990s. Thus, for 
many workers who tumed 50 after the regulation of early retirement was 
tightened up, the option of leaving the labor market early no longer existed, 
therefore increasing their exposure to the risk ofunemployment. 
Our second and third hypotheses concem the transition from employment 
into retirement and disability pensions. We assume that the likelihood of 
early retirement must have decreased among more recent cohorts compared 
to those who were already 50 and older in 1988 (H2). After more than a 
decade of fertility decline, policies aiming to channel senior workers into 
retirement became financially unsustainable in most OECD countries, and 
Hungary was no exception. The pension reforms implemented by the 
Hungarian government during the second period of the transformation were 
clearly aimed at delaying the average age of retirement in the working 
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population by making applications for early retirement more difficult. 
Another consequence of pension reforms that we expect to confirm is that, as 
stated earlier in this chapter, disability pensions became an altemative escape 
route for senior workers in the younger cohorts for whom an early retirement 
pension was no longer easily attainable (H3). 
Social inequalities 
Our next three hypotheses address social inequalities. First, we expect to 
confirm that social class and education are major factors conditioning the risk 
of unemployment in late careers (H4). On the one hand, because de-
industrialization is known to diminish the retums to manual work, we expect 
to observe that the likelihood of suffering unemployment was higher for 
blue-collar workers than for white-collar employees. On the other hand, since 
globalization entails increasing competition, tuming professional skills and 
higher education into crucial assets for being well positioned in the labor 
market, we expect to confirm that the better educated were less likely to 
suffer unemployment. 
Second, we hypothesize that social class and education also playa crucial 
role in determining the relative risks of leaving the labor market either via 
early retirement or via disability pension (H5). We as sume that the same 
social groups that face higher risks of unemployment also experience higher 
probabilities of applying for early retirement or a disability pensiono Policies 
designed by Hungarian governments in accordance with employers' needs to 
actively encourage early retirement have been strongly conditioned by the 
dramatic economic restructuring brought about by the re gime change 
(Bukodi and Róbert 2006). As described, such changes entailed a major 
shrinkage of the manufacturing and agricultural sector as well as the 
redundancy of less educated and less skilled workers. 
Third, regarding changes over time, we expect to confirm that social 
inequalities have grown across the cohorts, because retums to education have 
increased for younger generations (Bukodi and Róbert 2002, 2003, 2006). 
We believe that the economic restructuring and the institutional pressures to 
postpone the retirement age have not impacted on all social classes and 
educational groups equally and, indeed, that they have brought about a trend 
toward increasing social inequalities (H6). 
Pension Income 
Regarding pension income, we propose four hypotheses. First, we as sume 
that pension income is significantly higher among social groups that were 
less penalized by the de-industrialization and restructuring processes brought 
about by the re gime change, that is to say, those with university education 
Hungary 215 
and belonging to the service class (H7). We also propose that instabilities in 
late careers have a significant impact on pension income after retirement. 
Thus, We expect to show that workers who suffered at least one episode of 
unemployment during their late career prior to retirement tend to have lower 
pension income (H8). We also assume that workers who choose the 
'disability pattem' get a lower pension income than those who left the labor 
market via 'normal early retirement' (H9). This would reinforce the idea that 
applying for disability pension became a lesser of two evils for many workers 
who accepted lower pension income as a means to avoid unemployment. 
Finally, we shall test the assumption whether the most recent cohorts have 
experienced a loss in pension income compared to earlier ones (HIO) and 
also whether inequalities in pension income due to social class and 
educational attainment have increased over cohorts (Hll). 
DATA AND METHODS 
We base our analyses on data from the MONITOR 2003 survey. This survey 
was carried out by the TÁRKI Social Research Center, and is based on a 
random sample of households in which all members of 15 years and older 
were interviewed. It is a cross-sectional survey with a retrospective 
employment history starting in 1988. Therefore, to analyze late careers, we 
organize the data as a person-year file containing both time-variant and time-
constant covariates that provide individual information for the period 
between 1988 and 2003. However, because information on income was 
collected for 2003 alone, the analyses of pension income require the design 
of a different data file and the use of a different statistical method of analysis. 
Dependent Variables and Analytical Strategy 
Transitions into unemployment, retirement and disability pensions 
To examine the determinants of entering into unemployment and moving into 
retirement or applying for a disability pension, we consider individuals aged 
40-54 who had a job in 1988 (938 cases: 412 men and 526 women). Those 
who became retired or disabled or simply moved out of the labor market 
following different paths during the observation period - from 1988 to 2003 
- are dropped from the risk set, becoming right censored. Those who became 
reemployed, which is rather rare in the Hungarian context, are reentered into 
the risk set. The dependent variables are therefore binary variables taking the 
value 1 at the time when a given individual became unemployed, retired, or 
disabled but otherwise taking the value O. It should be noted that those who 
became unemployed or moved out of the labor market but did not retire or 
claim a disability pension are not right censored in the analyses ofretirement 
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and disability pensions. For the analyses on retirement, we right censor those 
cases that became disabled; and conversely, for the analyses on disability, we 
right censor those who started receiving a disability pensiono 
Apart from descriptive statistics and sequence analysis, the main statistical 
instruments are discrete-time, event history models with three destinations. 
Several logit models are estimated to asses the impact of an array of 
independent variables on the risks of suffering unemployment and moving 
into retirement or elaiming a disability pensiono Therefore, we consider three 
possible transitions: transition into unemployment, into retirement, and into a 
disability pensiono We implement separate models for men and women when 
analyzing transitions into retirement and to a disability pension, because 
official ages of retirement in Hungary differed for men and women until they 
finally converged to age 62 in 2009. However, for the risk ofunemployment, 
we estimate a set of joint logit models for both men and women, ineluding 
one variable controlling for gender differences. 
Pension income 
After restricting the sample to 913 individual s aged 50-74 years in 2003 who 
were already retired, we use reported pension income in 2003 to construct 
our metric dependent variable. First, we convert reported income in 
Hungarian Forint into Euros (applying the set exchange rate on September 
15, 2003) and then calculate the logarithm to reduce the effect of extreme 
cases. 
Independent variables 
All independent variables are binary except age, which is metric. As one of 
our main purposes is to compare three different cohorts, we inelude two 
dummies in the models to account for the effect of belonging to the later 
cohorts (those bom between 1934 and 1938 and those bom between 1939 and 
1943) compared to the most recent one (those bom between 1944 and 1948) 
that serves as our reference category. 
The variables designed to capture the effect of education and social elass 
are sets of dummies. The effect of education is accounted for by grouping 
individuals into four categories: those with elementary education or less, 
those with basic vocational training (the reference category), those with 
secondary education (ineluding technical secondary, academic secondary 
[Gymnasium or grammar school] and postsecondary) and those with tertiary 
education. To assess the impact of social elass, we use a collapsed version of 
the Erikson-Goldthorpe--Portocarero (EGP) elassification. Workers are 
divided into five different groups: those belonging to the service class, those 
employed as routine non-manual employees, the self-employed, skilled 
manual workers (the reference category), and finally, semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers and agriculturallaborers. 
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Models of retirement and disability pension also inelude one dummy 
variable accounting for the effect of having suffered an episode of 
unemployment after age 40. Additionally, in order 10 test the possibility that 
the effects of sorne of our independent variables change across cohorts, we 
inelude interaction terms in sorne of our models. 
For the analyses of pension income, the set of independent and control 
variables are age of retirement (metric), cohort, type of pension (retirement 
pension or disability retirement pension), gender, education, social elass and 
one dummy variable reflecting the effect of being unemployed immediately 
before moving into retirement or elaiming a disability pensiono 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Analyses 
Table 8.2 shows that a non-negligible number of senior workers in Hungary 
are indeed leaving the labor market before age 50. It also indicates that 
inactivity rates at age 50 and the median retirement age for people employed 
at age 50 have increased over the cohorts. Table 8.2 additionally shows that 
not only inactivity but also self-employment at age 50 and unemployment 
after age 50 have grown across cohorts. Results also reflect an increase over 
cohorts in the proportion of people who leave the labor market by applying 
for a disability pensiono This suggests a deterioration in the financial situation 
of an increasing number of pensioners, because disability pensions are, on 
average, lower than normal retirement pensions. 
Sequence Analyses 
Separate sequence analyses are performed for men and women. Our results 
are based on two subsamples of 117 men and 120 women. In both cases, we 
select individuals bom between 1938 and 1942 and base both analyses on the 
information we have on their late careers since 1988 (when they were 46-50 
years of age) until they reached age 61. 
Results for men show that 65.8 percent transited directly from employment 
10 retirement and 6.8 percent from employment to a disability pensiono Up 10 
11.1 percent suffered unemployment before moving into retirement, and 2.6 
percent suffered unemployment before elaiming a disability pensiono Only 2.6 
percent returned from unemployment 10 employment before entering 
retirement. Finally, we found that only 6 percent of the observed individuals 
kept working until the end ofthe observation periodo 
Because the official age of retirement was lower for women, it was not too 
much of a surprise to find that as many as 85.5 percent of them transited 
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directly from work to retirement. An additional 4.2 percent moved from work 
to disability pensiono Up to 7.5 percent entered retirement after one episode 
of unemployrnent, and only 0.8 percent remained working during the whole 
observation periodo We believe that as the official retirement age for women 
rises, their late career pathways will tend to resemble those of meno 
Table 8.2 Descriptive indicators for late career transitions and retirement 
across different birth cohorts 
Men Women 
Birth cohort a 1938 1941 1945 1938 1941 1945 
-40 -44 -48 -40 -44 -48 
Employment status at age 50 (in %) 
Dependent employed 87.22 70.48 49.65 75.90 69.19 67.56 
Self-employed 2.78 5.82 13.68 0.00 2.92 1.24 
Unemployed 0.00 6.67 3.33 3.61 3.68 3.84 
Inactive 10.00 17.03 33.34 20.48 24.21 27.35 
Late career characteristics b 
Unemployed after age 50 (in %) 19.44 17.48 23.16 7.94 16.79 18.01 
Transition to retirement 
Median retirement age b 57.00 58.00 d 54.00 53.00 57.00 
Mean retirement age e 56.70 55.86 53.89 54.03 53.32 53.60 
Kind ofpension received (in %) b 
Normal retirement pension 94.44 51.46 7.37 98.41 89.78 32.30 
Disability pension 4.17 22.33 22.11 1.59 7.30 18.01 
Not retired 1.39 26.21 70.53 0.00 2.92 49.69 
Pension income (in Euro) e 
Median yearly pension 2,827 2,850 2,379 2,340 2,214 2,356 
Median yearly retirement pension 2,827 3,204 3,204 2,301 2,261 2,471 
Median yearly disability pension 1,97ge 2,347 2,280 2,996e 1,767 2,120 
Average yearly pension 3,305 3,273 2,877 2,668 2,769 2,846 
Average yearly retirement pension 3,352 3,674 3,935 2,662 2,829 3,299 
Average yearly disability pension 2,246e 2,351 2,524 2,996e 2,023 2,033 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (2003). 
Notes: 
a Our observation window starts in 1988 and ends in 2003. Therefore, the oldest cohort is 
observed until it reaches 60-63; the interrnediate, until 59-62; and the most recent, until 55-
58. 
b Based on those who were still employed at the age of 50. 
c Based on those who were still employed at the age of 50 and were already retired when 
observed in 2003. 
d Only 29.5 percent were retired before age 58, the oldest age for which we have observations 
from this cohort in 2003. 
e Estimates based on information from fewer than 10 cases. 
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Figure 8.1 Sequence analysis of late career pathways for Hungarian men 
aged 50-61 years 
• Fm ployed IBlUnemployed EDisabled ~Retired IIIOther trans itions 
Source: Own ca1culations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Figure 8.2 Sequen ce analysis oflate career pathwaysfor Hungarian women 
aged 50-61 years 
85.5% 
7.5% 
4.2% 
2.5% 
0.8% 
.Employed IIIUnemplo)ed IIIDisabled IIIRetired 1II0ther trnnsitions 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Logistic Regression Analyses: Transitions to Unemployment, Retirement 
and Disability Pension 
Here we present and discuss the results fram our models of transitions to 
unemployment, retirement and a disability pensiono Each table includes one 
first baseline model accounting for the effects of cohort and age. Models 2 
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and 3 reflect the effects of social class and education. For analyses on 
unemployment risks, Model 4 accounts for interaction effects between 
cohorts and social class and Model 5 accounts for interactions between 
cohorts and education. For analyses on transitions to retirement and a 
disability pension, Model 4 includes a dummy controlling for previous 
unemployment experience and Model 5 includes the interaction terms 
between cohorts and education. We do not show models accounting for 
interactions between cohorts and social class, because none of them were 
significant. 
Unemployment 
The transformation of Hungary into a market economy created a new 
scenario in which se cure employment is no longer guaranteed by 
governmental doctrine. The results in Table 8.3 clearly reflect such 
contextual change, indicating that during their late careers the two more 
recent cohorts (1939-43 and 1944--48) suffered higher risks of 
unemployment than the oldest one (1934-38). It must be noted that the oldest 
cohort comprises those individuals who were already 50-54 in 1988 (when 
the socialist system collapsed); thus, they were 'old enough' to benefit from 
the generous early retirement pension provisions offered by the state during 
the first phase of the transition. This measure, intended to keep 
unemployment rates low, seems to have been quite effective. 
Our models also show that unemployment risks were higher for manual 
workers than for white-collar employees. We also found strong evidence 
indicating that those who completed tertiary education were better sheltered 
against unemployment than the rest. Conceming the evolution of the impact 
of social class over time, we have not found any statistically significant trend. 
However, we found sorne signs that educational inequalities in the risk of 
unemployrnent have increased among senior workers over the period covered 
by this study. A significant increase in the risk ofunemployment is observed 
for those who have only elementary or secondary education when results for 
the two more recent cohorts are compared. AH these findings are consistent 
with the well-known facts that de-industrialization implies a reduction in 
employment opportunities for blue-collar workers and that globalization 
increasingly rewards the better educated. 
Retirement 
Estimates for the transition to early retirement shown in Tables 8.4 for men 
and 8.5 for women reflect how dramaticaHy individual behavior responded to 
institutional changes in the Hungarian context. On the one hand, the higher 
likelihood of retirement experienced by workers of the oldest cohort must be 
interpreted as a consequence of governmental policies encouraging early 
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Table 8.3 Unemployment risk of Hungarian women and men in the late 
career (logistic regression model) 
Cohorts 
1934-38 
1939-43 
1944-48 (ref.) 
Age (40 plus) 
Gender 
Male (ref.) 
Female 
Social class 
Service class 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled worker (ref.) 
Unskilled worker 
Education 
Elementary 
Vocational (ref.) 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Interaction effects a 
1934-38 * Service class 
1934-38 * Unskilled 
1939-43 * Service class 
1939-43 * Routine 
1939-43 * Unskilled 
1934-38 * Elementary 
1934-38 * Secondary 
1939-43 * Elementary 
1939-43 * Secondary 
1939-43 * Tertiary 
Constant 
Observations 
Cases 
Events 
-1.83** 
0.02 
0.04* 
-5.64** 
8,397 
938 
172 
2 
-2.05** 
-0.05 
0.05** 
-0.07 
-0.94** 
-0.47 
-0.90 
0.53** 
-6.21** 
8,397 
938 
172 
3 
-2.04** 
-0.07 
0.05** 
0.00 
0.32 
-0.55* 
-1.43** 
-6.10** 
8,397 
938 
172 
4 
-2.30* 
0.12 
0.05** 
-0.07 
-0.99** 
-0.34 
-0.88 
0.63* 
1.19 
0.10 
0.00 
-0.43 
-0.27 
-6.23** 
8,397 
938 
172 
5 
-1.96+ 
0.54+ 
0.05** 
0.00 
0.69** 
-0.27 
-1.61 * 
-0.34 
0.38 
-1.01** 
-0.88+ 
0.26 
-6.32** 
8,397 
938 
172 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
-827.54 -803.09 -805.61 -802.31 -801.01 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Notes: 
** Effect .signific.ant at p < 0.01, * effect significant at p < 0.05, + effect significant at p < 0.10. 
a Sorne mteractlOn effects were not calculated due lo lack of cases or events. 
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retirement during the first phase of the transition. Such policies were 
particularly appealing to an increasing number ofredundant senior workers for 
whom early retirement seemed a far betler altemative than unemployment. On 
the other hand, the decreased risk of retirement among workers in the most 
recent cohort is the result of several pension reforms carried out by the 
Hungarian government during the 1990s in order to delay the average age of 
Table 8.4 Transition to retirement of Hungarian men in the late career 
(logistic regression model) 
Cohorts 
1934-38 
1939-43 
1944-48 (ref.) 
Age (40 plus) 
Social class 
Service class 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled worker (ref.) 
Unskilled worker 
Education 
Elementary 
Vocational (ref.) 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Experienced unemployment 
Interaction effects a 
1934-38 * Elementary 
1934-38 * Secondary 
1934-38 * Tertiary 
1939-43 * Elementary 
1939-43 * Secondary 
1939-43 * Tertiary 
Constant 
Observations 
Cases 
Events 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
1.12** 
1.03** 
0.33** 
-21.45** 
4,157 
412 
203 
2 
0.94** 
0.94** 
0.35** 
-0.43* 
0.28 
-1.28* 
0.30 
-22.41 ** 
4,157 
412 
203 
-611.60 -601.61 
3 
1.08** 
1.01 ** 
0.35** 
4 
1.20** 
1.02** 
0.34** 
5 
1.12** 
0.57 
0.35** 
0.18 0.18 -0.18 
-0.19 -0.13 -1.16+ 
-0.72** -0.65* -0.33 
-22.09** 
4,157 
412 
203 
0.63* 0.61 * 
-21.87** 
4,157 
412 
203 
0.02 
1.13 
-0.76 
0.82 
l.24+ 
-0.01 
-22.00** 
4,157 
412 
203 
-604.40 -601.22 -596.63 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Notes: 
** Effect significant at p < 0.01, * effect significant at p < 0.05, + effect significant at p < 0.10. 
a No significant interaction effects for social class were observed. 
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retirement. This major policy shift, common to many other European 
societies, was adopted as a response to the problem of demographic ageing. 
Conceming social inequalities, Models 2 and 3 from both tables indicate 
that those who belong to the service class face lower risks of early retirement 
than the rest - not counting the self-employed. It is not surprising that the 
self-employed are the less likely to retire early, because these types of 
Table 8.5 Transition to retirement of Hungarian women in the late career 
(logis tic regression model) 
Cohorts 
1934-38 
1939-43 
1944-48 (ref.) 
Age (40 plus) 
Social class 
Service class 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled worker (ref.) 
Unskilled worker 
Education 
Elementary 
Vocational (ref.) 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Experienced unemployment 
Interaction effects a 
1934-38 * Elementary 
1934-38 * Secondary 
1934-38 * Tertiary 
1939-43 * Elementary 
1939-43 * Secondary 
1939-43 * Tertiary 
Constant 
Observations 
Cases 
Events 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
1.19** 
0.84** 
0.34** 
-20.51 ** 
4,600 
526 
342 
2 
1.12** 
0.83** 
0.35** 
-0.31 
-0.11 
-0.81 * 
0.16 
-20.80** 
4,600 
526 
342 
-929.69 -924.75 
3 
1.11 ** 
0.86** 
0.36** 
4 
1.24** 
0.94** 
0.35** 
5 
2.23** 
1.40** 
0.36** 
-0.20 -0.21 -0.07 
-0.42* -0.36+ 0.19 
-1.00** -0.92** -0.29 
0.55* 0.62* 
-0.86+ 
-1.42** 
-1.17 
-0.15 
-0.85+ 
-0.97+ 
-21.01** -20.7l** -21.51** 
4,600 
526 
342 
4,600 
526 
342 
4,600 
526 
342 
-919.28 -915.75 -909.91 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Notes: 
** Effect significant at p < 0.01, * effect significant at p < 0.05, + effect significant at p < 0.10. 
a No significant interaction effects for social class were observed. 
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workers tend to remain active until older ages in aH developed economies 
(Blondal and Scarpetta 1998), and Hungary does not seem to be an excep~on 
here. Plus, most early retirement plans implemented by the Hunganan 
government targeted mainly employees and not the self-employed (Bukodi 
and Róbert 2006). 
Our models also indicate that men and women with tertiary education are 
less likely to retire early than those with lower education, even after 
controlling for previous unemployment experiences that are more frequent 
among less educated workers. 
Models accounting for interaction effects between cohort and education 
show that social inequalities remained the same for men but increased for 
women when comparing the oldest (1934-38) with the intermediate (1939-
43) cohorts. However, compared to the oldest and intermediate cohorts, the 
effects of education appear to be less pronounced in the most recent cohort 
(1944-48). We also computed models accounting for interaction effects 
between cohorts and social class, but no coefficient was found to be 
significant. 
Disability pension 
According to previous research, transitions into disability pension have 
become more common than early retirement in recent years (Bukodi and 
Róbert 2006). Our results shown in Tables 8.6 and 8.7 also indicate that the 
likelihood of applying for a disability pension has increased significantIy 
across the three cohorts. They also confirm the existence of important social 
inequalities, indicating that this likelihood depends greatly on educational 
attainment. People with only elementary education are more prone to choose 
this less attractive pathway into retirement than people with vocational 
training or secondary education, who, in tum, are also more likely to apply 
for a disability pension than those with tertiary education. All this holds true 
even after controHing for previous unemployment experiences. With respect 
to social class, only the self-employed are significantly less likely than the 
rest to retire via a disability pensiono This 'basic' inequality structure 
conditioning the risks of applying for a disability pension is found in each 
cohort, suggesting that this is the route out of the labor market for people at 
the lower end of the educational system, and no major changes have occurred 
overtime. 
Linear Regression Analysis: Pension Income 
Results presented in Table 8.8 show that in 2003, after 15 years of economic 
transformation and institutional reforms, pension income in Hungary is 
greatly determined by social class and educational attainment. 
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Coefficients indicate that those who worked as white-collar employees 
(especially the service class) eam more after retirement than those employed 
as blue-collar workers. Furthermore, among manual workers, the unskilled 
have lower levels of pension income than the skilled. Conceming the role of 
education, results clearly show that the higher educated (especially those with 
a university degree) tend to benefit from higher pensions after retirement. 
Table 8.6 Transition to disability pension of Hungarian men in the late 
career (logistic regression model) 
Cohorts 
1934-38 
1939-43 
1944-48 (ref.) 
Age (40 plus) 
Social class 
Service class 
Routine non-manual 
Se1f-employed 
Skilled worker (ref.) 
Unskilled worker 
Education 
Elementary 
Vocational (ref.) 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Experienced unemployment 
Interaction effects a 
1934-38 * Elementary 
1934-38 * Secondary 
1934-38 * Tertiary 
1939-43 * Elementary 
1939-43 * Secondary 
1939-43 * Tertiary 
Constant 
Observations 
Cases 
Events 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
2 3 4 5 
-3.54** -3.74** -3.65** -3.46** -16.53** 
-1.13** -1.20** -1.15** -1.12** -0.62 
0.08** 0.10** 0.09** 0.08** 0.08** 
-7.51 ** 
4,157 
412 
94 
-0.45 
-0.45 
-1.86* 
0.40 
-8.01 ** 
4,157 
412 
94 
0.56* 0.55** 0.61 * 
-0.30 -0.29 0.01 
-0.71+ -0.65+ -0.57 
-7.80** 
4,157 
412 
94 
0.83** 0.80** 
-7.27** 
4,157 
412 
94 
13.90 
b 
b 
-0.43 
-1.69* 
-0.32 
-7.40** 
4,157 
412 
94 
-426.72 -416.60 -419.30 -415.08 -411.74 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Notes: 
** Effect significant at p < 0.01, * effect significant at p < 0.05, + effect significant at p < 0.10. 
a No significant interaction effects for social class were observed. 
b These interaction effects could not be calculated due to lack of cases or events. 
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Results shown in Table 8.8 confirm that disability schemes provide les s 
income than normal retirement pensions - which is in line with what was 
anticipated in Table 8.2. They also indicate that those individuals who 
suffered unemployment prior to their exit from the labor market tend to 
receive lower income after retirement than those who moved directly from 
working to retirement or a disability pensiono 
Table 8.7 Transition to disability pension of Hungarian women in the late 
career (logis tic regression model) 
Cohorts 
1934-38 
1939--43 
1944--48 (ref.) 
Age (40 plus) 
Social class 
Service class 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled worker (ref.) 
Unskilled worker 
Education 
Elementary 
Vocational (ref.) 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Experienced unemployment 
Interaction effects a 
1934-38 * Elementary 
1934-38 * Secondary 
1934-38 * Tertiary 
1939--43 * Elementary 
1939--43 * Secondary 
1939--43 * Tertiary 
Constant 
Observations 
Cases 
Events 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
-2.50* 
-1.36** 
0.09** 
-8.14** 
4,600 
526 
80 
-388.57 
2 
-2.65** 
-1.41 ** 
0.09** 
0.07 
0.46 
1.32+ 
0.86* 
-8.81** 
4,600 
526 
80 
-383.50 
3 
-2.80** 
-1.48** 
0.10** 
0.56+ 
-0.08 
-1.82* 
-8.64** 
4,600 
526 
80 
-377.12 
4 5 
-2.58* -15.34** 
-1.37** -0.44 
0.08** 0.08** 
0.53 
-0.00 
-1.69* 
0.70* 
-7.88** 
4,600 
526 
80 
-374.73 
0.64+ 
0.14 
-2.14* 
0.68* 
13.08 
b 
b 
-1.12 
-1.66 
0.95 
-7.99** 
4,600 
526 
80 
-372.63 
Source: Own calculations based on the T ARKl MONITOR survey (1988-2003). 
Notes: 
** Effect significant at p < 0.01, * effect significant at p < 0.05, + effect significant at p < 0.10. 
a No significant interaction effects for social class were observed. 
b These interaction effects could not be calculated due to lack of cases or events. 
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Our models do not provide any evidence pointing to a significant change 
in the levels of pension income across cohorts or suggesting a trend toward 
increasing inequalities between different social groups. However, it must be 
noted that our possibilities of exploring changes over time and across cohorts 
are limited, because the only information our data provides on pension 
income is for the year 2003. 
Table 8.8 Monthly pension income (linear regression model) 
Cohorts 
1929-33 
1934-38 
1939--43 
1944--48 (ref.) 
1949-53 
-0.06 
-0.02 
-0.01 
-0.06 
2 3 
-0.05 
0.03 
0.03 
-0.09 
0.01 
0.07+ 
0.03 
-0.13* 
4' 
-0.12* 
-0.07+ 
-0.07+ 
-0.09 
5' 
-0.10 
-0.08 
-0.07 
-0.06 
Age ofretirement (50 plus) 
Gender 
0.03** 0.02** 0.01 ** 0.01 0.00 
Male (ref.) 
Female -0.12** -0.13** -0.19** -0.18** 
Social class 
Service class 
Routine non-manual 
Self-employed 
Skilled worker (ref.) 
Unskilled worker 
Education 
Elementary 
Vocational (ref.) 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
Experienced unemployrnent 
Disability pension 
Constant 
Cases 
Log Pseudo Likelihood 
R2 
3.83** 
913 
-604.12 
0.07 
0.38** 
0.12** 
-0.11 
-0.19** 
4.49** 
913 
-0.09** 
0.26** 
0.60** 
4.61 ** 
913 
--488.54 --466.99 
0.28 0.31 
-0.08* 
0.25** 
0.57** 
-0.28** 
-0.13** 
5.18** 
913 
--436.17 
0.36 
Source: Own calculations based on the TARKI MONITOR survey (2003). 
Notes: 
-0.09 
0.26** 
0.58** 
-0.12** 
-0.28** 
5.20** 
913 
--433.28 
0.35 
** Effect significant at p < 0.0 1, * effect significant at p < 0.05, + effect significant at p < 0.10. 
a Models 4 and 5 accounted for interaction effects between cohorts and education or social 
class. No significant interaction effects were observed. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Senior Hungarian workers were confronted with the combined effects of 
three major social changes within a rather short period of time. First, they 
experienced the transformation from a socialist to a free market economy, 
which put to an end the state-Ied policy of full employment. Second, they 
suffered the con sequen ces of accelerated de-industrialization, highly 
conditioned by the process of increasing intemational competition known as 
globalization. And third, they had to cope with a series of pension reforms 
aimed at limiting the access to retirement as a consequence of the 
demographic aging of the Hungarian population. In this study, we have used 
information from three different cohorts ofHungarian workers to measure the 
impact of economic transformation, de-industrialization, globalization and 
pension reforms on their late careers and pension income. 
Our comparison between workers of different cohorts confirmed our first 
three hypotheses: unemployment risks increased over the cohorts (Hl), the 
likelihood of early retirement decreased (H2) and the probability of applying 
for disability pension increased (H3). This c1early confirms that governmental 
policies implemented during the first phase of the transformation period 
succeeded in channeling large numbers of Hungarian senior workers into 
retirement and sparing them from unemployment. In our view, these results 
also prove that as early exit from the labor market into normal retirement 
became limited by pension reforms, late careers in Hungary have become 
increasingly unstable and workers are more likely to either suffer 
unemployment or to c1aim a disability pension in order to avoid it. 
Besides a trend toward increasing instabilities in late careers over time, 
our research has also confirmed the existence of important social inequalities. 
We have shown that the risk of unemployment and the likelihood of 
retirement - in any of its forms, normal early retirement or disability pension 
- depend significantly on social c1ass and educational attainment (H4 and 
H5). Evidence has been provided indicating that the service c1ass and the 
higher educated are significantly les s likely to suffer unemployment during 
their late careers, and also that they are less prone to apply for early 
retirement or to c1aim a disability pensiono However, our models did not offer 
results suggesting that the observed social inequalities in late career partems 
have changed significantly across the cohorts analyzed (H6). 
Similar pattems of inequalities were also observed in our analysis of 
pension income. Pensions were found to be higher among workers of the 
service c1ass and among workers with a university degree than among the 
remaining categories of workers (H7). Results have also shown that suffering 
unemployment prior to retirement and c1aiming a disability pension rather 
than a normal early retirement pension are factors strongly associated with 
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lower pension income (H8 and H9). Finally, we have found neither major 
differences in pension levels between the three cohorts analyzed (HI0) nor a 
trend toward increasing social inequalities in pension income (Hll). 
It is c1ear to us that the responses implemented by Hungarian institutions 
and social actors to transform the economy of the country and adapt it to an 
environment of increasing global competition have greatly shaped the late 
career pattems of Hungarian workers and buffered the growth of social 
inequalities. More recent pension reforms - designed to cope with 
demographic ageing - coincide in time with a period of economic recovery 
that contributed to alleviating the pressure to dismiss or relocate senior 
workers. Nevertheless, we would expect that the social inequalities in the 
incomes of older people will increase in the future with the gap between the 
least educated and the rest becoming more pronounced. In more recent 
cohorts, poorly educated workers are less and less likely to accumulate the 
appropriate amount of 'service time' (Le., years in employment) to be eligible 
for retirement schemes of any kind, and even if they are eligible, their very 
low wages will ensure that their pension incomes will be distinctively low. 
Those predicted trends are surely exacerbated by the current economic crises. 
NOTE 
1. The participation of Dr. Alberto Veira-Ramos in this project was possible thanks to a 
postdoctoral grant provided by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (MICINN) in 
cooperation with the Spanish Foundation for Science and Research (FECYT), (ID: 2008-
0886). We would also like to thank Paul Schmelzer for helpful suggestions and comments. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Beck, Ulrich (1992), Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage. 
Blondal, Sveinbjom and Stefano Scarpetta (1998), 'The Retirement Decision in 
OECD Countries', OECD Working Paper AWP No. 1.4, Paris: OECD. 
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter (2001), 'Globalization, Social Inequality and the Role of 
Country-specific Institutions. Open Research Questions in a Leaming Society', in 
Pedro Conceicao, Manuel V. Heitor and Bengt-Ake Lundvall (eds), Towards a 
Learning Society: Innovation and Competence Building with Social Cohesion lor 
Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 303-24. 
Blossfeld, Hans-Peter, Sandra Buchholz and Dirk Hofácker (2006), Globalization, 
Uncertainty, and Late Careers in Society, New York: Routledge. 
Buchholz, Sandra, Annika Jabsen, Karin Kurz, Julia Marold, Paul Schmelzer and 
Hans-Peter Blossfeld (2009), 'Globalization, Economic Restructuring and 
Increasing Uncertainty in Old Age. A Theoretical Framework', flexCAREER 
Working Paper, Germany: University ofBamberg. 
Bukodi, Erzsébet and Péter Róbert (2002), 'Men's Career Mobility in Hungary in the 
1990s', GLOBALlFE Working Paper No. 38, Germany: University ofBamberg. 
230 Country-specific Contributions 
Bukodi, Erzsébet and Péter Róbert (2003), 'Women's Career Mobility in Hungary in 
the 1990s', GLOBAL/FE Working Paper No. 53, Germany: University of 
Bamberg. 
Bukodi, Erzsébet and Péter Róbert (2006), 'Late Careers and Career Exits in 
Hungary', in Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Sandra Buehholz and Dirk Hofáeker (eds), 
Globalization, Uncertainty, and Late Careers in SOciety, New York: Routledge, 
pp. 323-52. 
Cornmander, Simon and János Kollo (2004), 'The Changing Demand for Skills: 
Evidenee from the Transition', IZA Working Paper No. 1073, Bonn: IZA. 
DiPrete, Thomas A., Dominique Goux, Erie Maurin and Miehael Tahlin (2001), 
'Institutional determinants of employment ehanees. The strueture of 
unemployrnent in Franee and Sweden', European Sociological Review, 17, 233-
54. 
Ehrlieh, Éva and Gábor Révész (1994), 'Várakozások és valóság. Folyamatok 1989 és 
1993 kozott', Kozgazdasági Szemle, XLI, 192-213. 
Gál, Róbert 1. and Géza Tarcali (2003), 'Pension reform and intergenerational 
redistribution in Hungary', Paper on the PIE International Workshop on 'Pension 
Reform in Transition Economies', Hitotsubash: lER. 
Giddens, Anthony (1999), Runaway World: How Globalisation is Reshaping our 
Lives?, London: Profile Books. 
Kertesi, Gábor and János Ko1l5 (2002), 'Labour Demand with Heterogeneous Labour 
Inputs after the Transition in Hungary, 1992-1999', Working Papers on the 
Labour Market No. 5, lE-HAS, Budapest. 
Kézdi, Gabor (2002), 'Two Phases of Labour Market Transition in Hungary, 
Interseetorial Realloeation and Skill-biased Teehnologieal Change', Working 
Papers on the Labour Market No. 3, Budapest: lE-HAS. 
KOllo, János and Beáta Naesa (2004), Flexibility and Security in the Labor Market -
Hungary 's Experience, Budapest: ILO-CET. 
Kolosi, Tamás and Péter Róbert (2004), 'Key proeesses of struetural transformation 
and mobility in Hungarian society sinee the fall of eommunism', in Tamás Kolosi, 
Gyorgy Vukovich and István Gyorgy (eds), Social Report 2004, Budapest: 
TÁRKI, pp. 47-71. 
Lelkes, Orsolya and Ágota Seharle (2004), 'Low Participation among Older Men and 
the Disineentive Effeets of Social Transfers: The Case of Hungary', in Tamás 
Kolosi, István Gyorgy Tóth and Gyorgy Vukovieh (eds), Social Report 2004, 
Budapest: TÁRKI, pp. 233-48. 
Simonovits, András (1999), 'The New Hungarian Pension System and its Problems', 
KTKlIE Discussion Papers 1999/1, Budapest: Institute of Eeonomies Hungarian 
Aeademy of Seienees. 
Széman, Zsuzsa (1994), 'Employer Polieies Towards Older Workers in Hungary', 
SocoProject Paper No. 11, WIIW, Vienna. 
